Unmanned Systems

Unmanned Systems [US]

(Including)

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles [UAV and UCAV]

Real Div Ltd's [RDL's] main goals are to:

reduce dangers for everyone on Earth, from CO2 (and other green-house-gas [GHG]) emissions and
reduce deaths and injuries for everyone on Earth from road travel, including associated costs.

Many government agencies (military, naval and associated corporations) are engaged in the design, construction and operation of UAV and UCAV. While UAV, and to some extent UCAV, are extremely important technologies and tools, to both government agencies and to RDL's goals, their respective emphasises are different. For example: only one of their many projects, deal with using hydrogen as a fuel, which is a major focus of RDL. On the other hand, development of smaller, very precisely aimed weapons, for use by UCAV is one of their major foci, to limit collateral damage, while also avoiding pilot's deaths, injuries and captures. RDL had not considered avoiding collateral damage in quite the same way. In fact, RDL has only peripherally considered any civilian use of UCAV, and then only if a possibility of attack by terrorists comes to light, while not sufficiently guarded, by friendly police or military forces.

The idea of a slightly modified version of the Global Hawk, without carrying weapons, but capable of cooperation with military forces, was very attractive, and still is. It is part of a much greater plan:

Removing the need for pilots in the air, replacing them with pilot/air-traffic-controllers [PATC] on the ground
Reducing the need: 1) for large aircraft fueled by fossil fuel and carrying several hundred people each; 2) but, replacing them with much smaller aircraft 4) fueled by hydrogen, 5) traveling within flocks of autogyros, flown (controlled) by autopilots and PATC
Also, reducing the need: 1) to travel (to be productive), by providing video-conference communications in homes, 2) to travel by huge airplanes, by leaving from home to final destination; 3) but, instead, traveling in small pilotless, vertically-capable autogyros 4) guided by autopilots and PATC, 5) fueled by hydrogen, 6) produced at home,7) by electrolyzing water,8) powered by electricity, generated by sunlight, skylight and wind
This reduces: 1) the need for airports, 2) their extensions and new buildings, 3) the wasted time and money getting to the airport, 4) waiting, 5) clearing inspection and 6) the danger of driving on the roads to get to the airport and 7) getting to destinations.
Two Global Hawks (renamed Mother Hawks) replacing (the need for) most airports in the UK (for example); but, operated from two operating centers [PATCO] which control takeoffs, flights (in flocks) and landings, in Gavin Hawks, of millions of people traveling for real necessity or real pleasure directly from their home directly to their real destinations.

History and Future of Aviation
In War and Peace

Powered aircraft were invented in1903 by Wilbur and Oliver Wright. They were supported by the US Government to build planes for reconnoitering, in World War I, this was a big success and with further developments by the US, Great Britain, France and Germany of bi-planes (and one or two tri-planes) became fighter aircraft with one pilot or a pilot and a rear gunner. A big improvement was the ability to fire a machine gun through the propeller and, for that time, fitting ailerons to the wings, to control banking, instead of warping the wing itself.

Between the wars, airplanes were used to carry mail, stage displays (barnstorms) close to towns, and by October 11, 1927 fly across the Atlantic to Paris, France, by a solo pilot, Charles Lindberg.

An early contemporary history of autogyros is on Autogyro History. This includes some data on helicopters, a version capable of vertical take off and landing, plus the ability to hover, but too late to fight in World War II [WWII].

By the beginning of WW II, in 1939, the Americans had developed mono-wing fighters and four-engine bombers, especially the B-17s. Most used radial engines, except the Japanese Mitsubishi Zero fighter and the British Spitfires, with Rolls Royce Merlin engine, and their Hurricanes. Shortly after the beginning, the North American P-51 with an Allison in-line engine was developed, then immediately improved by using the Merlin, instead. This make it possible to escort several thousand American and British heavy bombers day and night, over all their targets in Continental Europe. (The wings of the P-51 also improved even further, over the excellent Spitfire wings, inspiring GE's idea for autogyro rotor blades.)

Please see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties: “The total estimated human loss of life caused by World War II was roughly 72 million people, making it the deadliest, and most destructive war in human history. The civilian toll was around 47 million, including 20 million deaths due to war related famine and disease. The military toll was about 25 million, including the deaths of about 4 million prisoners of war in captivity. The Allies lost approximately 61 million people, and the Axis powers lost 11 million.” And also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing#Strategic_Bombing: “The strategic bombing conducted in World War II was unlike anything the world had seen before. The campaigns conducted in Europe, in China and at the end of the war over Japan, could involve thousands of aircraft dropping tens of thousands of tonnes of munitions over a single city.”

“Strategic-bombing campaigns were conducted in Europe and Asia. The Germans and Japanese made use of mostly twin-engined bombers with a payload of approximately one ton, and never developed larger craft to any extent. By comparison, the British and Americans (who started the war with similarly-sized bombers and a few larger designs) developed their strategic force as one based upon much larger four-engined bombers for their strategic campaigns. The payload carried by these planes ranged from 2.7 tons for the B-17 Flying Fortress, to 9 tons for the B-29 Superfortress, with some specialty aircraft, such as the 'Special B' Avro Lancaster carrying an 11-ton (9,979 kg) Grand Slam bomb.”

“During the first year of the war in Europe, strategic bombing was developed through trial and error. The Luftwaffe had been attacking both civilian and military targets from the very first day of the war when Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. A strategic bombing campaign was launched to force Great Britain to a peace agreement after the proposed plan of the invasion of Great Britain was dropped. Initially, the raids took place in daylight, then changed to night bombing attacks when losses became unsustainable. The Royal Air Force also switched to night bombing for the same reasons. The United States Army Air Forces adopted a policy of daylight bombing for greater accuracy as, for example, during the Schweinfurt raids. That decision entailed much higher American losses until long-range fighter escorts became available.”

“Strategic bombing was a way of taking the war into Europe while Allied ground forces were no closer to fighting Germans there than North Africa. Between them, the Allied air forces claimed to be able to bomb around the clock; in fact, no target was ever hit by British and American forces the same day, nor was there a coordinated plan for "round the clock" bombing on any target.”

“Even single missions have been considered to constitute strategic bombing. The British bombing of Peenemunde was such an event, as was the bombing of the Ruhr dams. The Peenemunde mission pushed back Nazi Germany's missile program until it became a case of too little, too late.”

“Strategic bombing in Europe never reached the decisive completeness the American campaign against Japan achieved, helped in part by the fragility of Japanese housing, which was particularly vulnerable to firebombing through the use of incendiary bombs. The destruction of German infrastructure became apparent, but the Allied campaign against Germany only really succeeded when the Allies began targeting oil refineries and transportation in the last year of the war. At the same time, strategic bombing of Germany was a morale boost to the Allies in the period before land war resumed on the Western front.”

“If the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service and the Imperial Japanese Army Air Service frequently used strategic bombing over large Chinese cities such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, Nanjing and Chongqing, in the Pacific theatre, organized strategic bombing on a large scale by the Japanese seldom occurred. The Japanese army in most places advanced quickly enough a strategic bombing campaign was unnecessary. In those places where it was required, the smaller Japanese bombers (in comparison to British and American types) did not carry a bomb load sufficient to inflict the sort of damage occurring daily at that point in the war in Europe, or later in Japan.”

“The development of the B-29 gave the United States a bomber with sufficient range to reach the Japanese Home Islands. The capture of the Japanese island of Iwo Jima further enhanced the capabilities the Americans possessed in their strategic bombing campaign. Conventional bombs and incendiary bombs were used against Japan to devastating effect.”

As effective as it was on destroying military targets and killing civilians by making weapons, Air Power did not win the war against Germany, until land soldiers occupied the land, from Russia, the United States, Great Britain and its Commonwealth Allies. Air Power worked in Japan, but only after B-29 bombers dropped an atomic bomb on both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and raised the ante to total destruction.

After WWII, the nature of war changed. In America and Europe, the idea of war practiced by soldiers, directed by political leaders, to invade and conquer countries to force them to become resources banks to support the government and its political leaders, became too expensive, and too risky. Their last adventure was France and England trying to take the Suez Canal.

Russia tried several more, with more defeats (and stalemates) than victories, even by using pawns [proxys], to protect themselves from direct confrontation from nuclear-armed powers, especially the United States. Russia lost the last big gamble, by direct confrontation of the United States, using Cuba as their pawn. Then China re-launched the proxy/pawn wars, using North Korea, then North Viet Nam. For America, their Air Power won a draw, in Korea and a defeat in Viet Nam. No real gain, for anyone there, either. No major power’s leaders had stomach for this any more. Reasonably free trade, and some effort to encourage, or at least tolerate, economic growth, could lead to more popular support and a better life for the people and the leaders, than any form of war could offer.

Just one exception: In Japan, in 1945, there were Kamikaze pilots, who were willing to die to defend the Emperor, which is certain death, not just risk death in battle as (almost) every male accepted, given the right tutelage. The Japanese Emperor, and all but a few of his military supporters, gave up, even in view of Kamikaze support.

Fanatic terrorists, such as Osama Ben Laden, no longer seriously threatened by atomic (now nuclear) bombs, are still willing to send out their neo-Kamikaze, now defending Muhammad, rather than any particular Emperor. CIA sponsored “termination with extreme prejudice” of leaders in favor of Kamikaze, or nuclear, attacks, has ocassionally been approved, but unsuccessful.

Aviation, even armed with atom bombs, with the one exception of Japan, has never been the trump card in winning a war. Neither the hoped for use of strategic bombing to win the war, nor nuclear bombs from the air, seem to be practical war fighter techniques any longer. Actually, the only threats to human survival on Earth seems to be based on: 1) small scale guerrilla war, hoping for a repeat of victory over Japan with a Weapon of Mass Destruction [WMD], or hoping that will trigger massive nuclear war between major powers or perhaps some medium sized nuclear powers, or simply 2) global warming (unwittingly triggered by human use of fossil fuels) melting ice, raising the sea levels and disrupting of weather patterns enough to cause breakdown of economic systems, governments, and public health mechanisms. If neither of these eventualities are terminal, nor both together, perhaps they could be followed by another century of war, patterned on WWII, with truly WMD, sufficient for extinction of the human race.

Since WWII, only the USA and, to a lesser degree, Russia were powerful enough in aviation, and, now, space technology, to be a major threat to a national leadership bent on a war of conquest. During the Cold War, America was not interested in conquest, but mostly on defending America (and Western Europe) against Russia, whereas Russia had already got more than it could digest by gobbling up the scraps from the German feeding table, choking on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The people in the United States, if not yet the political leaders, had lost their appetite for losing soldiers, even in defending non-communist countries from Russian or Chinese (and their proxy) invaders. At that time, few Americans had visited, or cared about, foreign lands or their people, but had previously accepted the idea of fighting in self-defense of their homeland, after the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. (More political leaders had been abroad or at least knew someone who had.) Democracy actually did work, American Presidents settled for a draw in Korea, and (even what was, obviously) a defeat in Viet Nam. Foreign wars could still get voter support of leaders, but only if nobody got drafted to fight overseas.

A whole new definition of War Fighter got defined: 1) only the lives of volunteers will be risked in foreign wars. But, of course, if they volunteered to join, they can’t back out until their time is up, and 2) no problem, if Unmanned System [US] are used in combat or in any danger, including (but not limited to) an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle [UAV] (cannot carry a weapon) or an Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle [UCAV] (carrying weapons). Anybody can use it as long as nobody can ride in it. In all cases of US, they are intended to return to base, if possible, not work like a Kamikaze, ramming into something or emolliating themselves. Another principle governing UCAV is that their weapons should be of the smallest calibre capable of destroying the intended target. Small is better. Very accurate is superb. Both avoid unnecessary “collateral” damage by weapons. (So, more politically acceptable to everybody, combatants, bystanders and neutrals.) Small also applies to UAV, as economics and survivorship are also important: cheaper to build, to fly and less likely to be shot down, so needing to be replaced. Being "unmanned" [U] is also critical: 1) if lost, it is not a human life lost (nor captured), 2) can be smaller, lighter, cheaper and 3) less likely to be lost. US are also capable of more violent manoeuvring without injury from G-forces, therefore more likely to avoid enemy fire.

Programming computers is cheaper than training pilots. Also, remote pilots flying US are easier to train and take little or no expensive, in-flight training. And, simulator training can use the same equipment as is used to actually fly USs remotely. Finally, one remote pilot can fly four or more US at a time, and one flock of autogyros can include up to 500 pilotless autogyros with 3000 troops aboard. So, one pilot is needed for four flocks carrying 12,000 passengers to four different trips simultaneously, as opposed to one pilot for the largest airplanes carrying 600 passengers, all on the same trip.

Most of what has been done with US has been aimed at small (as small as 6 inches) and midget airplanes, but broadly applicable to helicopters, and considered, or in development, for sea vessels and in connection with submarines. Almost everything is technologically transferable to Unmanned Autogyros [UA] (this time we mean pilotless autogyros, even if they can carry passengers). (Of course, the design of the Global Hawk is almost identical to what is needed for a Mother Hawk. In the overall scheme, of 84 Mother Hawks, a minor improvement would be to change the engine to burn hydrogen, producing water, instead of CO2, in the exhaust.) The same approach to flying several million pilotless Gavin Hawks (instead of a few Global Hawks or Mother Hawks mostly requires a Xerox machine in the back office). Seriously, RDL plans ro recruit and train 4,000, remote, combination pilot/air-traffic-controllers [PATC], which are required to cover the next 22 years, for the entire World. If 8 million passenger Gavin Hawks (with an average of four people riding in each one) were aloft, 32 million people would be traveling in the air that day. This would take an average of 16,000 flocks of Gavin Hawks, and each PATC would control 4 flocks. (In the UK 2002 400,000 traveled by air, on average, every day. On one such day, this would take up only 1.25% of the system’s capacity.)

US designers has not seriously considered the problem of their USs emitting CO2, probably fair enough, in view of less than a thousand USs have been built so far and they are not flying every day. RDL proposes a maximum of 8 million aloft (by 2030), in any one day; but the 16 million probably flown only once every four weeks (28 days), 13 times every year. An average trip is 100 miles. This would average 208m trips of about 20.8b miles/year, for 83.2b passenger miles/year. If these take the 16 million cars off the road (driven 15k, ie 240b miles/year, with an average of two passengers, then 480b passenger miles), and if the UA burn the same amount of fossil fuel per passenger mile as cars do, then the CO2 they emit is 17.34% times as much as the cars they would have driven do.

This reduces their personal CO2 emissions from using cars, from 2 tons/year to 0.3468 tons/year. Once the autogyros are converted to hydrogen fuel, the 0.3468 tons/year is also eliminated. RDL calculates that this is also the passenger miles traveled in fossil fueled aircraft which contributed 40% of their emissions, ie 4 tons/person per year, so their overall contribution is reduced by 6 tons each year, for a reduction of 60% of their total. (75% of the remaining 40% left can be eliminated by converting the fossil fuel used in homes and businesses and industrial plants in Utopia to hydrogen, in the same manner as supplying hydrogen to fuel Zero-CO2 autogyros, leaving 10% to be handled by other means.)

Meeting the challenge of neo-Kamikazists, and the residual political leaders seeking power via war, still relies largely on aviation (coordinated with sea power and missile technology) backed up by soldiers-on-the-ground [SOTG] (to the extent that democratically inclined people are still willing to risk that). The United States political leadership has used the MAD:
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutual_assured_destruction)
trump card twice. Firstly, against Japan (at little, or no, risk) then against Russia (with unknown risks). They won both times. No, even remotely democratic country's, political leadership wants to continue to depend on the MAD trump card, again. Nor, do even remotely democratic country's, military leadership want to depend on voter support of the "soldiers-on-the-ground" [SOTG] trump card.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles
[UAV and UCAV]

Real Div Ltd's [RDL's] main goals are to:

reduce danger for everyone on Earth, from CO2 (and other green-house-gas [GHG]) emissions and
reduce deaths and injuries for everyone on Earth from road travel, including the associated costs.

Many government agencies (military and naval and associated corporations) are engaged in the design, construction and operation of UAV and UCAV. While UAV, and to some extent UCAV, are extremely important technologies and tools, to both government agencies and to RDL's goals, their respective emphasises are different. For example: only one, of their many projects, deal with using hydrogen as a fuel, which is a major focus of RDL. On the other hand, development of smaller, very precisely aimed weapons, for use by UCAV is one of their major foci, to limit collateral damage, while avoiding deaths, injuries or captures of pilots. RDL had not considered avoiding collateral damage in quite the same way. In fact, RDL has only peripherally considered any need for civilian use of UCAV, and then only if a possibility of attack by terrorists comes to light, while not sufficiently guarded against by police or friendly military forces.

The idea of a slightly modified version of the Global Hawk, without carrying weapons, but capable of cooperation with military forces, was very attractive, still is, and is part of a much greater plan:

Removing the need for pilots in the air, replacing them with pilot/air-traffic-controllers [PATC] on the ground, enabling pilotless flying of autogyros (thus no trained pilots on board, though autopilots are there to do automatic, programmable tasks, including take off, joing a flock and landing, plus avoiding collisions, and take instructions from and send data to PATCs)
Reducing the need 1) for large aircraft fueled by fossil fuel and carrying several hundred people each, 2) by replacing them with much smaller, hydrogen fueled aircraft 4) traveling in flocks of autogyros
Also, reducing the need: 1) to travel (to be productive), by providing video-conference communications in homes, 2) to travel by huge airplanes and leaving directly from home to final destination, 3) in small pilotless, vertically-capable, pilotless autogyros, 4) fueled by hydrogen, 5) produced at home, 6) by electrolyzing water, 7) powered by electricity, 8) generated by sunlight, skylight and wind.
This reduces: 1) the need for airports, 2) their extensions and new builds, 3) the wasted time and money getting to and from airports, 4) waiting, 5) clearing inspection and 6) the danger of driving on the roads to get to the airport.
Six Global Hawks (renamed Mother Hawks) replacing (the need for) expansion and operating of airports in the UK (for example), operated by six two-man PATC crews working in two pilot/air-traffic-controller operating centers [PATCO] which also control the takeoffs, flights (in flocks) and landings, of millions of people traveling for real necessity or real pleasure directly from their home directly to their real destinations.

History and Future of Aviation
In War and Peace

Powered aircraft were invented in1903 by Wilbur and Oliver Wright. They were supported by the US Government to build planes for recognizance, in war. In World War I, this was a big success and with further developments by the US, Great Britain, France and Germany of bi-planes (and one or two tri-planes) became fighter aircraft with one pilot or a pilot and a rear gunner. A big improvement was the ability to fire a machine gun through the propeller and, for that time, fitting ailerons to the wings, to control banking, instead of warping the wing itself.

Between the wars, airplanes were used to carry mail, stage displays (barnstorms) close to towns, and by October 11, 1927 fly from America, across the Atlantic to Paris, France , by one pilot, Charles Lindberg. An early contemporary history of autogyros is on Autogyro History. This includes some data on the helicopter, an improved version capable of vertical take off and landing, plus the ability to hover, but too late to fight in World War II [WWII].

By the beginning of WW II, in 1939, the Americans had developed mono-wing fighters and four-engine bombers, especially the B-17s. Most used radial engines, except the Japanese Mitsubishi Zero fighter and the British Spitfires and Hurricanes, with Rolls Royce Merlin engines. Shortly after the beginning, the North American P-51 with an Allison in-line engine was developed, then immediately improved by using the Merlin, instead, making it possible to escort several thousand American and British heavy bombers day and night, over all their targets in Europe. (The wings of the P-51 also improved even further, over the excellent Spitfire wings, inspiring GE's idea for autogyro rotor blades.)

Please see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties: “The total estimated human loss of life caused by World War II was roughly 72 million people, making it the deadliest, and most destructive war in human history. The civilian toll was around 47 million, including 20 million deaths due to war related famine and disease. The military toll was about 25 million, including the deaths of about 4 million prisoners of war in captivity. The Allies lost approximately 61 million people, and the Axis powers lost 11 million.”
And also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing#Strategic_Bombing: “The strategic bombing conducted in World War II was unlike anything the world had seen before. The campaigns conducted in Europe, in China and at the end of the war over Japan, could involve thousands of aircraft dropping tens of thousands of tonnes of munitions over a single city.”

“Strategic-bombing campaigns were conducted in Europe and Asia. The Germans and Japanese made use of mostly twin-engined bombers with a payload of approximately one ton, and never developed larger craft to any extent. By comparison, the British and Americans (who started the war with similarly-sized bombers and a few larger designs) developed their strategic force as one based upon much larger four-engined bombers for their strategic campaigns. The payload carried by these planes ranged from 2.7 tons for the B-17 Flying Fortress, to 9 tons for the B-29 Superfortress, with some specialty aircraft, such as the 'Special B' Avro Lancaster carrying an 11-ton (9,979 kg) Grand Slam bomb.”

“During the first year of the war in Europe, strategic bombing was developed through trial and error. The Luftwaffe had been attacking both civilian and military targets from the very first day of the war when Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. A strategic bombing campaign was launched to force Great Britain to a peace agreement after the proposed plan of the invasion of Great Britain was dropped. Initially, the raids took place in daylight, then changed to night bombing attacks when losses became unsustainable. The Royal Air Force also switched to night bombing for the same reasons. The United States Army Air Forces adopted a policy of daylight bombing for greater accuracy as, for example, during the Schweinfurt raids. That decision entailed much higher American losses until long-range fighter escorts became available.”

“Strategic bombing was a way of taking the war into Europe while Allied ground forces were no closer to fighting Germans there than North Africa. Between them, the Allied air forces claimed to be able to bomb around the clock; in fact, no target was ever hit by British and American forces the same day, nor was there a coordinated plan for "round the clock" bombing on any target.”

“Even single missions have been considered to constitute strategic bombing. The British bombing of Peenemunde was such an event, as was the bombing of the Ruhr dams. The Peenemunde mission pushed back Nazi Germany's missile program until it became a case of too little, too late.”

“Strategic bombing in Europe never reached the decisive completeness the American campaign against Japan achieved, helped in part by the fragility of Japanese housing, which was particularly vulnerable to firebombing through the use of incendiary bombs. The destruction of German infrastructure became apparent, but the Allied campaign against Germany only really succeeded when the Allies began targeting oil refineries and transportation in the last year of the war. At the same time, strategic bombing of Germany was a morale boost to the Allies in the period before land war resumed on the Western front.”

“If the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service and the Imperial Japanese Army Air Service frequently used strategic bombing over large Chinese cities such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, Nanjing and Chongqing, in the Pacific theatre, organized strategic bombing on a large scale by the Japanese seldom occurred. The Japanese army in most places advanced quickly enough a strategic bombing campaign was unnecessary. In those places where it was required, the smaller Japanese bombers (in comparison to British and American types) did not carry a bomb load sufficient to inflict the sort of damage occurring daily at that point in the war in Europe, or later in Japan.”

“The development of the B-29 gave the United States a bomber with sufficient range to reach the Japanese Home Islands. The capture of the Japanese island of Iwo Jima further enhanced the capabilities the Americans possessed in their strategic bombing campaign. Conventional bombs and incendiary bombs were used against Japan to devastating effect.”

As effective as it was on destroying military targets and killing civilians making weapons Air Power did not win the war, against Germany, until land soldiers occupied the land, from Russia, the United States, Great Britain and its Commonwealth Allies. Air Power worked in Japan, but only after B-29 bombers dropped an atomic bomb on both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and raised the ante to total destruction.

After WWII, the nature of war changed. In America and Europe, the idea of war practiced by soldiers, directed by political leaders, to invade and conquer countries to force them to become resources banks to support the government and its political leaders became too expensive, and too risky. Their last adventure was France and England trying to take the Suez Canal. Russia tried several more, with more defeats (and stalemates) than victories, even by using pawns, to protect themselves from direct confrontation from nuclear-armed powers, especially the United States. Russia lost the last big gamble, by direct confrontation of the United States, using Cuba as their pawn. Then China re-launched the proxy-pawn wars, using North Korea, then North Viet Nam. For America, their Air Power won a draw, in Korea and a defeat in Viet Nam. No real gain for anyone there either. No major power’s leaders had stomach for this any more. Reasonably free trade, and some effort to encourage,or at least tolerate, economic growth, could lead to more popular support and a better life for the people and the leaders, than any form of war could offer.

Just one exception: In Japan, in 1945, there were Kamikaze pilots, who were willing to die to defend the Emperor, which is certain death, not just risk in battle as (almost) every male accepted, given the right tutelage. The Japanese Emperor, and his military supporters gave up, even in view of Kamikaze support, which came closer to defeating the USA than anything else.

Fanatic terrorists, such as Osama Ben Laden, no longer seriously threatened by atomic (now nuclear) bombs, are still willing to send out their neo-Kamikaze, now defending Muhammad, rather than any particular Emperor. CIA sponsored “termination with extreme prejudice” of leaders in favor of Kamikaze, or nuclear, attacks, has so far been approved, but unsuccessful. (RDL will revisit this matter after discussion of military/naval operation of pilotless autogyros.)

Aviation, with the one exception of Japan, has never been the trump card in winning a war. Neither the hoped for use of strategic bombing to win the war, nor nuclear bombs from the air, seem to be practical war fighter techniques any longer. Actually, the only threats to human survival on Earth seems to be based on: 1) small scale guerrilla war, hoping for a repeat of victory over Japan with a Weapon of Mass Destruction [WMD], also hoping that will trigger massive nuclear war between major powers or perhaps some medium sized nuclear powers, or simply 2) global warming (unwittingly triggered by human use of fossil fuels) melting ice, raising the sea levels and disrupting of weather patterns enough to cause breakdown of economic systems, governments, and public health mechanisms. If neither of these eventualities are terminal, nor both together, perhaps they would be followed by another century of war, patterned on WWII, with truly WMD, sufficient for extinction of the human race.

Since WWII, only the USA and, to a lesser degree, Russia were powerful enough in aviation, and now space technology, to be a major threat to a national leadership bent on a war of conquest. During the Cold War, America was not interested in conquest, but mostly on defending America (and Western Europe) against Russia, whereas Russia had already got more than it could digest by gobbling up the scraps from the German dining table, with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The people in the United States, if not yet the political leaders, had lost their appetite for losing soldiers, even in defending non-communist countries from Russian or Chinese invaders. At that time, few Americans had visited, or cared about, foreign lands or their people, but had previously accepted the idea of fighting in self-defense of their homeland, after the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor, in Oahu, Hawaii . (More political leaders had been abroad or at least knew someone who had.) Democracy actually did work, American Presidents settled for a draw in Korea, and (even what was, obviously) a defeat in Viet Nam. Foreign wars could still get voter support of leaders, but only if nobody got drafted to fight overseas.

A whole new definition of War Fighter got defined: 1) only the lives of volunteers will be risked in foreign wars, but of course if they volunteered to join, they can’t back out until their time is up, and 2) no problem if Unmanned System [US] are used in combat or in danger, including (but not limited to) an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle [UAV] (cannot carry a weapon) or an Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle [UCAV] (can carry weapons). Anybody can use it as long as nobody can ride in it. In all cases of US, they are intended to return to base, if possible, not work like a Kamikaze, ramming into something or emolliating themselves. Another principle governing UCAV is that their weapons should be of the smallest calibre capable of destroying the intended target. Small is better. Very accurate is superb. Both avoid unnecessary “collateral” damage by weapons. (So, more politically acceptable to everybody, combatants, bystanders and neutrals.) Small also applies to UAV, as economics and survivorship are also important: cheaper to build, to fly and less likely to be shot down and so needing to be replaced. Being “U” is also critical: 1) if lost is not a human life lost (nor captured), 2) can be smaller, lighter, cheaper and 3) less likely to get lost. US are also capable of more violent manoeuvring without injury from G-forces, therefore more likely to survive under enemy fire.

Programming computers is cheaper than training pilots. Also, remote pilots flying US are easier to train and take little or no expensive, in-flight training. And, simulator training can use the same equipment as used to remotely fly USs. Finally, one remote pilot can fly four or more US at a time, and one flock of autogyros can include up to 1000 pilotless autogyros with 4000 people aboard. So, one pilot is needed for four flocks carrying 16,000 passengers to four different trips simultaneously, as opposed to one pilot for the largest airplanes carrying 600 passengers, all on the same trip.

Most of what has been done with US has been aimed at small and midget airplanes, but broadly applicable to helicopters, and considered, or in development, for sea vessels and in connection with submarines. Almost everything is technologically transferable to Unmanned Autogyros [UA](this time we mean pilotless autogyros, even if they can carry passengers). (Of course, the design of the Global Hawk is almost identical to what is needed for a Mother Hawk. In the overall scheme, of 84 Mother Hawks, a minor improvement would be to change the engine to burn hydrogen, producing water, instead of CO2, in the exhaust.) The same approach to flying several million pilotless Gavin Hawks (instead of a few Global Hawks or Mother Hawks mostly requires a Xerox machine in the back office). Seriously, RDL plans to recruit and train 4,000, remotely operating, combination, pilot/air-traffic-controllers [PATC], which are required to cover the next 22 years, for the entire World. If 8 million Gavin Hawks (with an average of four people riding in each one) were aloft, 32 million people would be traveling in the air that day. This would take an average of 16,000 flocks of Gavin Hawks, and each PATC pair-of-two would control 4 flocks. (In the UK in 2002ad, 400,000 traveled by air, on average, every day. On one such day, this would take up only 1.25% of the system’s capacity.)

US designers has not seriously considered the problem of their USs emitting CO2, probably fair enough, in view of less than a thousand USs have been built so far and they are not flying every day. RDL proposes a maximum of 8 million aloft (by 2030), in any one day; but the 16 million probably flown only once every four weeks (28 days), 13 times every year. An average trip is 100 miles. This would average 208m trips of about 20.8b miles/year, for 83.2b passenger miles/year. If these take the 16 million cars off the road (driven 15k, ie 240b miles/year, with an average of two passengers, then 480b passenger miles), and if the UA burn the same amount of fossil fuel per passenger mile as cars do, then the CO2 they emit is 17.34% times as much as the cars they would have driven do.

This reduces their personal CO2 emissions from using cars, from 2 tons/year to 0.3468 tons/year. Once the autogyros are converted to hydrogen fuel, the 0.3468 tons/year is also eliminated. RDL calculates that this is also the passenger miles traveled in fossil-fueled aircraft, which contributed 40% of their emissions, ie 4 tons/person per year, so their overall contribution is reduced by 6 tons each year, for a reduction of 60% of their total. (75% of the remaining 40% left can be eliminated by converting the fossil fuel used in homes and businesses and industrial plants in Utopia to hydrogen, in the same manner as supplying hydrogen to fuel Zero-CO2 autogyros, leaving 10% to be handled by other means.)

Meeting the challenge of neo-Kamikaze and the residual political leaders seeking power-via-war still relies largely on aviation (coordinated with sea power and missile technology), backed up by soldiers on the ground [SOTG] (which democratically inclined people, whose votes are considered, are still willing to risk). The United States political leadership has used the MAD:

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutual_assured_destruction)

trump card twice. Firstly, against Japan (at little, or no, risk), then against Russia (with the risk unknown at that time). They won both times. Now, not even remotely democratic country's political-military leadership wants to depend on voter support of the SOTG trump card.

The latest available statement of the United States position on MAD follows:

"To continue to deter in an era of strategic nuclear equivalence, it is necessary to have nuclear (as well as conventional) forces such that in considering aggression against our interests any adversary would recognize that no plausible outcome would represent a victory or any plausible definition of victory. To this end and so as to preserve the possibility of bargaining effectively to terminate the war on acceptable terms that are as favorable as practical, if deterrence fails initially, we must be capable of fighting successfully so that the adversary would not achieve his war aims and would suffer costs that are unacceptable, or in any event greater than his gains, from having initiated an attack.

– President Carter in 1980, Presidential Directive 59, Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy"

Summary of Modern UCAV

From:
http://www.air-attack.com/page/28/X-47-Pegasus-UCAV-N.html
"As of May 2003, DARPA had given Northrop-Grumman the green light to build 2 demonstration versions of the X-47B Pegasus which measure 27.9 feet long and have a nearly equal wingspan of 27.8 feet. The X-47Bs will demonstrate the technical and operational feasibility of using a UCAV to conduct U.S. Navy missions from an aircraft carrier.

Expected capabilities of the Pegasus include a combat radius of 1,300 nautical miles with a payload of 4,500 pounds, and the ability to loiter for two hours over a target up to 1,000 nautical miles away, an operational altitude of greater than 35,000 feet and a high subsonic speed.

The X-47B is planned to be capable for three primary missions; surveillance/reconnaissance, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and strike and of course all the missions require stealth and consequent survivability.

Surveillance/reconnaissance: The X-47 will have passive and active sensor suites able to cover a large geographic area and have a long loiter time once over the target area.

Suppression of enemy air defense: The X-47 will be capable of defense stimulation, deception and neutralization as well as being remotely networked with theater and national sensor systems. Expect the plane to carry a complement of advanced SEAD ordinance and accurately target multiple enemies simultaneously.

Strike: The X-47 will be extremely survivable and will carry a complement of existing weapons, as well as a synthetic aperture radar and a state of the art electro-optical / infrared suite all the while being interoperable with current C4I systems."

From: (With emphasis emboldened by GE)

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/ucav-n.htm

"The goal of the joint DARPA/Navy UCAV-N program is to demonstrate the technical feasibility for an unmanned system to effectively and affordably conduct sea-based surveillance, strike and suppression of enemy air defense missions within the emerging global command and control architecture."

"The DARPA/Navy Naval Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle, or UCAV-N program, is a high-risk, but potentially high-payoff endeavor with the promise to prove the viability of a weapon system which might significantly enhance the war-fighting capabilities of the Naval Services in the 21st century. The goal of the joint DARPA/Navy project is to demonstrate the technical feasibility for a UCAV system to effectively and affordably conduct sea-based 21st century suppression of enemy air defenses, strike and surveillance missions within the emerging global command and control architecture."

"In DARPA's vision, the UCAV provides revolutionary new tactical air warfare capability, a weapon system that can be employed with the daring of a kamikaze but without the attendant ceremony, sorrow, and loss of the aircraft. Leaving the pilot at home eliminates risk to a very talented citizen. In addition, not accommodating a human on board the aircraft permits DARPA to design a machine that will be much less expensive to build and operate than a manned aircraft. In the Navy's draft RFP [request for proposals], they requested that the contractors propose appropriate autonomous aerial refueling capabilities."

"The Naval program, initiated in the summer of 2000 with Boeing and Northrop Grumman competitive teams, builds on DARPA/Air Force program research to explore Naval applications [launched and recovered from ships or Marine Corps austere bases ashore] for suppression of enemy air defenses and deep strike. In addition, DARPA looked at using the same aircraft or a variant for surveillance missions. Inclusion of surveillance in the mission set reflects the need for shipboard aircraft to be multi-mission capable, and the need for the Battle Group Commander to maintain an operational picture round the clock.

"It should be obvious that operation in this environment is markedly different from operation from an Air Force Base. As part of the naval global network centric warfare architecture, UCAV-N mission controllers will exploit real time data sources from the theater information architecture to respond to the dynamically changing battlefield.

The system will create superior situation awareness by leveraging the many sources of information available at both the tactical and theater levels. We will take into consideration this entire system of systems when conducting our design trades, thus ensuring that an optimal air vehicle, mission control system and external interface are developed."

"The system is based on the concept of Network Centric Warfare. The Mission Control System will employ operators at the center of information. Using intelligent decision aids, a single controller will be able to monitor and control several aircraft simultaneously. The air vehicle itself will be intelligent; for example it will diagnose its current health and prognose its future health so that it can maximize its mission capability with degraded functionality. At the squadron level, higher echelon tactical unit levels, and fleet levels, an autonomic logistics system will suggest courses of action to tactical commanders to maximize effectiveness of the aircraft and parent fighting units."

"As a product of the latest aircraft, design, manufacturing, and support concepts, the aircraft will be an affordable system to procure and operate. We have adopted the Autonomic Logistics concept developed by the Joint Strike Fighter Program. Thus supportability will be an integral part of the design, providing for minimal maintenance requirements and a very high sortie rate. The inclusion of size in the overarching metric emphasizes the criticality of shipboard deck space.

DARPA's vision is that unmanned aircraft can effectively and affordably prosecute persistent, sea-based suppression of enemy air defenses, deep strike, and surveillance missions within the 21st century global command and control architecture. To realize this vision, DARPA must mature and demonstrate a control system for multi-vehicle operations in Naval environments; a low life-cycle cost, mission effective sea-based design for the air vehicle; a command, control and communications system which is over-the-horizon capable as well as line-of-sight; dynamic mission planning & management approaches; off-board/on-board sensor fusion; as well as weapon carriage and targeting. And finally, getting at the basic reason for a Naval UCAV program distinct from its land-based counterpart, DARPA would develop the concept for and demonstrate ship-based operations including launch and recovery, deck handling and storage, maintenance and training, and interoperability with other Naval aviation systems."

From: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0ICK/is_2_16/ai_90529727/pg_7

"Editorial Abstract: The use of unmanned combat aerial vehicles in the skies over Afghanistan is just beginning to awaken the Air Force to the enormous potential of these aircraft. In this informative article, Colonel Chapman summarizes current developments regarding these vehicles and gives us a glimpse into their possible employment in the future."

Unmanned Systems [US] technology introduced a paradigm shift.

Thousands of years of experience had led attacking war fighters to protect themselves by delivering weapons from further and further distances; all the way from:

hand held weapons from a few feet,
spears or javelins, measured in yards,
long bows and guns from hundreds of yards, destroying the enemy's protection by personal armor,
cannon fire from miles away
airplanes, from hundreds of miles away, but dropping bombs from above (with the attackers still subject to cannon fired flak and interceptor fighter aircraft),
finally, by unmanned missiles from (effectively) space.

In this last case, once aimed and fired, Unmanned missiles leave the specific war fighters well protected and shielded from attack or retribution by distance (and anonymity). But, enemies, similarly equipped with unmanned missiles or with an air force, can still retaliate against the war fighter's fellow citizens. (The German V-1s and V-2s missiles were not a trump card, against the combined resources of the combined WWII Allies, nor were the Japanese Kamikaze.)

Highly developed Unmanned Systems [US] (especially aircraft), changes the risk, even against the SOTG problem, which also applies to pilots actually flying over enemy land (eg Gary Powers, See: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francis_Gary_Powers). There is no longer any specific war fighter who can be threatened, killed or deferred, indirectly, by soldiers' voting parents and relatives. The only enemy defense against potential attack or retaliation is to creditably threaten to extirpate a major portion of the entire population who permit use of US or who tolerate a political or military leadership who permit it. Ie the only option left to the enemy is to play the MAD card; but then only if their threat is credible. (The first time this card was played was by Harry Truman, the last time it was played was by John Kennedy. Now, Osama ben Laden and picayune, rogue-country leaderships are insane to expect to win anything from any kind of attack.)

So, why wasn't Unmanned cruise missiles, launched from ships, sufficient, as, say, against Iraq? They probably were, if they had been available in sufficient (even non-nuclear) numbers, but they still left the need for SOTG, not just surrender, as in Japan, allowing completely unopposed occupation. American use of nuclear cruise missiles would have required playing the MAD card. The American leadership's main justification for attacking Iraq was to prevent it from being able to play the MAD card, so it was impossible to excuse America for using it themselves. They had not been able to risk playing the SOTG card, when they had clear justification (at least to American voters), so could not now use MAD, except to prevent Iraq from played it.

Modern US are much more pervasive (than air forces and missiles), covering unmanned inspection (with or without permission), including reconnoitering, surveillance, and use of offensive and and defensive weapons. War fighters using US are (protected and shielded) controllers of the weapons and inspection devices including, but not limited to, UAV and UCAV.